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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Defendant/Appellant. J 
: Case No. 950383-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF DOYLE'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IN THE AFFIDAVIT 
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
After the filing of Appellant's brief, this Court addressed 
the constitutionality of "general" warrants in State v. 
Covington, 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 9/28/95). In 
Covington, this Court recognized that as a general rule, "open-
ended or general warrants are constitutionally prohibited." 
Covington, 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 
44 U.S. 85, 92 n.4, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342 n.4 (1979).* 
However, this Court further stated that the validity of "all 
persons present" search warrants—as was issued in the case at 
hand—would depend upon the evidence supporting the probable 
xThe holding in Covington is based solely upon Fourth 
Amendment grounds. Doyle argues that both this Court should 
examine the issue in this case under both the state and federal 
constitutions. Contrary to the State's assertion of waiver, 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution is, in fact, the central 
focus of Doyle's argument both on appeal and in the trial court. 
1 
cause for their issuance, Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23. 
This "probable cause" required for the issuance of an "all 
persons present" warrant is that "there is good reason to suspect 
or believe that anyone present at the anticipated scene will 
probably be a participant" to the illegal conduct." Covington. 
274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 (quoting State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 
849, 850 (N.J. 1972)). 
Doyle maintains that, under Covington, the evidence in the 
affidavit supporting the issuance of the "all persons present" 
warrant executed in this case is insufficient to support the 
necessary finding of probable cause that anyone present at the 
Hundley's trailer would be involved in illegal drug trafficking. 
Therefore, Doyle asserts that the warrant in this case is 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
A. Standard of Review 
Doyle argues that this Court should review the trial court's 
legal conclusion that the authority granting paragraph in the 
warrant was neither too broad nor vague for "correctness." The 
State, however, maintains that appellate courts should be 
subjected to the same deferential standard of review that a trial 
court is bound by in its review of a magistrate's determination 
of probable cause (Br. of Appellee at 10 (citations omitted)). 
Although this Court in Covington analyzed the validity of an 
"all persons present" in terms of whether probable cause had been 
established by the affidavit, this court never explicitly stated 
the standard of review to be employed in such an analysis. 
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However, this Court, in its analysis of how other jurisdictions 
have addressed the issue of "general warrants/" did note that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court "emphasized that an affidavit in 
support of a warrant seeking to authorize a search of any person 
present must be strictly scrutinized." Covington, 274 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 24. Moreover, this Court in Covington appears to have 
engaged in a de novo review of whether the facts alleged in the 
affidavit were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause: 
"We conclude that the affidavit in this case establishes probable 
cause to search all persons present at the basement apartment. 
We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress and affirm his conviction." Covington, 274 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. 
Therefore, Doyle requests that this Court "strictly 
scrutinize" the affidavit in this case and conclude that the 
facts alleged in the affidavit are insufficient to establish 
probable cause to search all persons present at the Hundley's 
residence. 
B. The Affidavit, upon which the Search Warrant in this Case 
Issued, is Insufficient to Support the Finding of Probable 
Cause Necessary to the Issuance of an "All Persons Present" 
Warrant 
In State v. Covington, 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 
9/28/95), this Court upheld the validity of an "all persons 
present" search warrant and affirmed the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress because the underlying affidavit 
established probable cause that anyone present at the apartment 
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would probably be a participant in illegal drug activity.2 
Doyle asserts that the factual allegations in the affidavit 
in this case, unlike that in Covington, are insufficient to 
establish probable cause for an "all persons present" search 
warrant; and therefore, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress and vacate his 
conviction. 
The affidavit in Covington indicates that the police 
received information from several individuals that drug 
trafficking was taking place at a basement apartment located at 
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove: Rachel Anderson, who was 
arrested for possession of methamphetamine on the day the search 
warrant was issued told officers that she stole the drugs from 
her supplier, Rick Close, who lived in a basement apartment at 
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove. Covington, 274 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 24. Three separate sources had provided officers with 
tips that Close had been selling methamphetamine with the past 
2The warrant in Covington authorized the search of ,f[t]he 
downstairs apartment and the person of all individuals present at 
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove [for] narcotics and other 
evidence of trafficking...." Covington, 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
23. When the officer's arrived at the residence they found the 
defendant, Stacey Covington, standing between the door to the 
apartment and a truck, parked approximately eight to ten feet 
away from the door. Id. One officer took custody of Covington, 
ordered him to lie down on the ground, frisked him and then after 
the apartment had been secured took him inside, stood him next to 
the other suspects, searched his person, removed from his person 
a marijuana pipe and a package of cigarettes which contained 
marijuana, and finally arrested him. Id. At the Pleasant Grove 
Police Department methamphetamine was found on Covington's 
person. Id. Covington subsequently pled guilty to two charges 
conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress. Id. 
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three weeks. Id. at 25. Finally, NET officers had been 
receiving tips from numerous sources that controlled substances 
were being sold from the 479 South 100 East residence for a year 
prior to the issuance of the warrant. 
In Doyle's case, however, the only information or "tips" 
received by the Provo Police Department were: One, from an 
anonymous caller six weeks before the search warrant issued who 
said that Steven and Angela Hundley were using and selling 
cocaine; that their address was 255 N. 1600 w. #121, Provo, Utah; 
and that Steven Hundley was "dealing heavily" at his place of 
employment, Mountain States Steel (R. 28). Two, from a 
confidential informant who told an officer that Steven Hundley 
was selling cocaine (R. 28). 
In addition, the affidavit in Covington detailed numerous 
police observations and activities which supported both the 
accuracy of the "tips" they had received as well as probable 
cause that all persons present at the apartment were likely to be 
involved in drug trafficking. For example, the officers checked 
the criminal histories of both Rachel Anderson and Rick Close and 
discovered that they both had a history of controlled substance 
violations. Covington, 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24-25. Officers 
had also recently searched Close's vehicle and found drug 
paraphernalia. Id. at 25. In addition, officers had conducted 
surveillance of the building at various times during the six 
months previous to the warrant's issuance and had arrested people 
residing in the building and had found paraphernalia and 
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controlled substances. Id. Finally, officers had observed the 
purchase of narcotics from the house by Darcy McDonald, who was 
subsequently arrested and charged with a controlled substance 
violation. Id. 
On the other hand, in Doyle's case the officers engaged in 
no such surveillance. There are no facts in the affidavit which 
indicate that officers had observed any illegal activities at the 
Hundley's residence. The only related activity prior to the 
issuance of the warrant which the officers engaged in was to 
seize and search the Hundley's garbage can wherein drug 
paraphernalia, marijuana leaves and stems, and a piece of paper 
with Steven and Angela Hundley's names and address were found (R. 
28). However, there was no evidence found by the officers to 
support the belief of widespread criminal activity which would 
justify the issuance of an "all persons present" warrant. 
Furthermore, all of the cases cited to by this Court in 
Covington in which "all persons present" warrants were validly 
issued, can be distinguished from Doyle's case.3 In each of 
these cases the affidavits in support of the "general" warrant 
contained corroborated information of wide-spread illegal conduct 
from knowledgeable sources in addition to substantial police 
observation and surveillance of extensive illegal activities. In 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass.), cert, 
denied, 492 U.S. 944, 97 S.Ct. 364 (1976); Commonwealth v. 
Heidelberg, 535 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); State ex rel. 
L.O., 566 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert, 
denied, 584 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1990); and People v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 
1156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). 
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Doyle's case, there was no surveillance from police and the only 
information came from one anonymous caller and a confidential 
informant. 
The rest of the factual allegations contained in the 
affidavit in Doyle's case are merely the unsupported opinion of 
the affiant and are insufficient to support a conclusion of 
probable cause for an "all persons present" warrant: 
The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant is 
issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit must 
contain specific facts sufficient to support a determination 
by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists. The 
affiant must articulate particularized facts and 
circumstances leading to a conclusion that probable cause 
exists. Mere conclusory statements will not suffice. 
State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). Neither the fact that methamphetamine users often 
become violent, nor that evidence would likely be overlooked if 
officers failed to search the curtilage of the residence or 
vehicles located thereon, support a probable cause determination 
that "all persons present" are likely to be involved in illegal 
activities (R. 27). Moreover, the affiant's opinion that most of 
the people who use controlled substances "also occasionally sell" 
is mere speculation unsupported by particular facts or 
circumstances. 
Doyle requests that this Court—like the Minnesota court in 
State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. App. 1987), a case 
analyzed by Doyle in Appellant's Brief pgs. 13-15—find that the 
factual allegations in the affidavit in this case, unlike that in 
Covington, are insufficient to establish probable cause for an 
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"all persons present" search warrant; and that therefore, the 
trial court's conclusion that the warrant's grant of authority 
was neither too broad nor vague was in error and that Doyle's 
conviction should accordingly be vacated with instructions to the 
trial court that evidence seized as a result of the 
unconstitutional warrant is to be suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE WARRANT HAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXECUTED 
If this Court finds that the "all persons present" warrant 
issued in this case is constitutionally valid on its face, Doyle 
requests that this Court find that the search of his person was 
beyond the scope of the warrant and unsupported by independent 
probable cause. 
The warrant issued in this case authorized the search of 
"the person of any individuals present at the time of execution" 
(R. 24). Doyle maintains that he was not "present at the time of 
execution" and that therefore, the search of his person after his 
arrival was outside the scope of the warrant. 
Doyle arrived at the Hundley's residence anywhere from 40 to 
75 minutes after the officers' had begun execution of the warrant 
(R. 89, 115). Officer Shawn Adamson testified that when Doyle 
arrived, the Hundley's had been arrested and their child had been 
picked-up (R. 114). Officer Denton Johnston's police report 
states: "At the completion of the search warrant two other 
individuals arrived at the home. A Shane Doyle and Terri Olson 
arrived" (R. 90). It is clear that in the minds of at least some 
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of the officers, the search warrant had been executed by the time 
Doyle arrived. 
This is an issue of first impression in Utah. In addition, 
Doyle has not found any other jurisdictions which have squarely 
addressed the issue at hand. However, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals in State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Minn. App. 
1987)—a case which held an "all persons present" warrant to be 
unconstitutional—noted that, "Another factor weighing in our 
decision is that respondent did not arrive on the premises 
immediately after the police did. Respondent arrived three hours 
later, as police were preparing to leave. Arguably, the warrant 
was no longer being executed when respondent entered the 
premises, although we do not rest our affirmance on this basis." 
Therefore, Doyle argues that the warrant as executed with regards 
to him was unconstitutional. 
Doyle urges this Court to hold that a warrant authorizing 
the search of "the person of any individuals present at the time 
of execution" requires the presence of an individual when police 
begin the execution of the warrant—that "the time of execution" 
is the time the police begin their activities pursuant to the 
warrant. 
Accordingly, Doyle requests that this Court find that the 
search of his person was outside the scope of the warrant, and 
that absent any evidence of independent and particularized 
probable cause, the search of his person was an unconstitutional 
violation of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
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Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the aforementioned arguments, this Court should 
find that the "all persons present" warrant executed in this case 
was unconstitutionally overbroad because its issuance was 
unsupported by probable cause. Alternatively, this Court should 
find that the search of Doyle's person was outside the scope of 
the warrant because he was not present "at the time of execution" 
and that the search of his person was not supported by 
independent probable cause. Regardless of the grounds, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Doyle's motion 
to suppress and remand the case to the Fourth District Court with 
directions to suppress the illegally obtained evidence and 
dismiss the charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fit day of December, 1995. 
GARE^ f P. LINDSAY \f 
n m e v for Dovle C/ Attorney for Doyle 
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